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Abstract—While huge efforts have been investigated in the
adversarial testing of convolutional neural networks (CNN), the
testing for recurrent neural networks (RNN) is still limited to
the classification context and leave threats for vast sequential
application domains. In this work, we propose a generic adver-
sarial testing framework RNN-Test. First, based on the distinctive
structure of RNNs, we define three novel coverage metrics to
measure the testing completeness and guide the generation of
adversarial inputs. Second, we propose the state inconsistency
orientation to generate the perturbations by maximizing the
inconsistency of the hidden states of RNN cells. Finally, we
combine orientations with coverage guidance to produce minute
perturbations. Given the RNN model and the sequential inputs,
RNN-Test will modify one character or one word out of the
whole inputs based on the perturbations obtained, so as to lead
the RNN to produce wrong outputs.
For evaluation, we apply RNN-Test on two models of common
RNN structure — the PTB language model and the spell checker
model. RNN-Test efficiently reduces the performance of the PTB
language model by increasing its test perplexity by 58.11%,
and finds numbers of incorrect behaviors of the spell checker
model with the success rate of 73.44% on average. With our
customization, RNN-Test using the redefined neuron coverage as
guidance could achieve 35.71% higher perplexity than original
strategy of DeepXplore.
Index Terms—Adversarial input generation, recurrent neural
networks, coverage metrics
I. INTRODUCTION
As the core part of the current artificial intelligence ap-
plications, deep learning has made great breakthroughs on
computer vision [1], [2], natural language processing [3] and
speech recognition [4], [5]. With the increasingly deployments
of deep neural network (DNN) systems in the security critical
domains, like automated driving [6] and medical diagnose [7],
ensuring the robustness of DNNs becomes the essential part
in the communities.
However, it is demonstrated that state-of-the-art DNNs
could produce completely different predictions, when fed with
the adversarial inputs [8]. This inspired numerous adversarial
testing works devoted to generate adversarial inputs for the
DNNs, aiming to provide rich sources for training the DNNs
to be more robust. The majority of these works [9]–[11]
mutate the inputs based on the perturbations obtained by
gradient descent. They exhibit high efficiency in generating
adversarial inputs, but achieve low testing completeness [12].
Recent years, multiple coverage criteria [12]–[14] are pro-
posed measuring the coverage achieved in various granularities
in the testing. They believe that reaching higher coverage could
increase the confidence of the reliability of the DNN.
In spite of the effectiveness of these works, they are largely
limited to the CNNs. Overall, there are two main types of
DNNs, the convolutional neural networks (CNN) [15] and
recurrent neural networks (RNN) [16]. They are of different
structures and suited for different kinds of tasks. CNNs intro-
duced the convolution layer and pooling layer to the traditional
fully connected DNNs, and have excellent performance in
image processing applications [17], [18]. RNNs are known
for their iterative structures and the support of temporal
information, hence good at handling tasks with sequential data,
like natural language processing [19] and speech recognition
[20]. Owing to the gap between their structures, the adversarial
testing on the two types of DNNs are hard to fit the other.
The adversarial testing for RNNs face certain challenges,
summarized as threefold. First, there is no rule to recognize
the adversarial input without the obvious class label. For the
sequential outputs not then applied to classification, there is no
standard to decide the outputs as wrong outputs with respect
to the changing degree. Second, mutating the sequential inputs
like texts is hard to ensure the minute perturbation. Applying
the perturbations to words in a discrete space always cannot
obtain a legal input and the explicit modification is distinguish-
able for humans. Third, the existing neuron based coverage
metrics of CNN fail to consider the characteristics of RNN
structures and could not be adopted directly.
Benefit from the simpler adaptation of works on CNNs,
the existing works on RNNs have also applied adversarial
testing to the classification domains. They perform well in
specific tasks, such as sentiment analysis of texts [21], [22]
and email classification [23], etc. For text inputs, most works
add, modify or delete a word/character to make sure the minute
alteration as a way against the second challenge. But the
adversarial testing for RNNs with the main sequential domains
are always left away or rather inadequate [24], [25], with the
first challenge not well addressed. Besides that, the coverage
metrics defined for the DNNs are also based upon CNNs,
which have thousands of neurons activated by the activation
function RELU. Instead, RNNs have significantly fewer states
activated by sigmoid and tanh, with completely different value
ranges. But this key issue is neglected by the relevant works
[26] for RNNs.
In this paper, we propose a generic adversarial testing
framework RNN-Test for recurrent neural networks, with no
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limit to tasks. First, we define three coverage metrics targeting
the particular computation logics of RNNs. Then, RNN-
Test primarily adopts the joint optimization of maximizing
the adversary orientations and boosting the coverage, which
enables the perturbations obtained in a gradient-based way.
In the adversary orientation module, we propose the state
inconsistency orientation to maximize the inconsistency of the
hidden states and lead the model to produce wrong outputs,
with the cost orientation adapted from FGSM [9] and the deci-
sion boundary orientation from DLFuzz [27]. In the coverage
boosting module, we first employ the coverage guidance to
obtain the perturbations, not only as the indicator of testing
completeness and the key goal to improve. Note that we only
keep the perturbations of one word/character to modify out of
the whole inputs, thus ensuring the tiny modification. Finally,
we address the first challenge by leveraging the performance
metrics of the tested models to assess the qualities of the
adversarial inputs.
For evaluations, we select the PTB language model [28] and
a spell checker model [29] based on their general structures
and common applications, and implement a customized ver-
sion of neuron coverage in DeepXplore [12] for comparison.
On the PTB model, RNN-Test demonstrates its effectiveness
in adversarial input generation by increasing the test perplexity
by 58.11% on average, where the state inconsistency orienta-
tion declines the model performance most among the three
orientations. With coverage boosting, the redefined coverage
of DeepXplore as guidance achieves 35.71% higher perplexity
than with random strategy of DeepXplore. Furthermore, we
retrain and improve the model by 1.159% using the augmented
training set with adversarial inputs. On the spell checker
model, the adversarial inputs result in the corrected mistakes
emerging again with the success rate of 73.44% averagely. It
is remarkable that the coverage guidance achieves the highest
success rate of 74.29% with the aid of the boosting procedure.
To summarize, our work has the following contributions:
• We define three coverage metrics customized for RNNs
and first exploit the coverage boosting procedure to
directly generate the adversarial inputs. During experi-
ments, we found that there is no linear correlation be-
tween the coverage value and the qualities of adversarial
inputs, and more efforts should be paid to improve the
qualities of inputs not the value of coverage.
• We propose the state inconsistency orientation to lead
the tested RNN models to behave worse, which is also
effective for adversarial input generation.
• We design, implement and evaluate the generic adver-
sarial testing framework RNN-Test, which is scalable for
variants of RNNs without the limit of the application con-
texts and support multiple combinations of orientations
and coverage metrics freely.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of RNN-Test on two
RNN models. RNN-Test could efficiently generate adver-
sarial inputs and improve the PTB model by retraining
with the augmented training set.
We organize this paper as follows. In Section II, we provide
the background related to RNN. In Section III, we formally
describe the design of RNN-Test in detail. Section IV presents
the evaluation results of RNN-Test. Section V discusses the
threats to validate the work. In Section VI, we introduce the
related works. Section VII makes a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deep Neural Network
From the biology view of perspective, artificial neural
networks were initially designed to imitate the structure of bi-
ological neurons with an activation process. The difference of
deep neural networks with respect to shallow neural networks
lies in more hidden layers to perform complex computation.
A fully connected network requires each neuron to establish
connections with all neurons in adjacent layers. Fig. 1a shows
the structure of a traditional DNN and Fig. 1b for a typical
neuron of DNN. For the traditional DNNs, the direction of
data flow is from input layer and hidden layers and then to the
output layer. Furthermore, CNNs keep the main feed forward
structure and introduce the convolution layer and pooling layer
to better extract the features of the inputs, which are mostly
images. Note that the activation function used in CNN is
usually RELU, which keeps the positive output value as the
same but treats other values as 0, so having infinite upper
bound.
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(b) Typical neuron
Fig. 1: Typical DNN structure
B. Recurrent Neural Network and the variants
RNN is widely applied in temporal sequence analysis.
For traditional deep neural networks like CNNs, neurons in
adjacent layers are fully connected while neurons within the
same layer has no explicit relations. As a result, CNNs cannot
deliver the context information surrounding the input data very
well.
An example of such tasks can be, for instance, predicting
next word with the knowledge of previous sentence. Because
of the semantic relationship between two words in a sentence,
we have to take the sequence of previous words into consid-
eration to predict next word. Fig. 2 depicts the typical RNN
structure and formula (1) summarizes the computation process
of RNN cell. The hidden state output hlt of the cell at time step
t in layer l is decided by current input hl−1t from the previous
layer as well as hlt−1 from the previous step in the same layer,
and then passed forward to compute the softmax predictions.
Consequently, RNN is able to represent the context informa-
tion in temporal sequences, which makes it appropriate for the
natural language processing tasks. Besides of this key design,
common RNNs always comprise two or three layers each with
several states when unfolded, much fewer than CNNs usually
of ten more layers each with hundreds of neurons. Moreover,
activation functions sigmoid and tanh are commonly used and
important in our definitions of coverage metrics.
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Fig. 2: RNN structure
hlt = f
(
W
(
hl−1t
hlt−1
))
, f ∈ {sigm, tanh} (1)
Variants of RNNs. Although RNNs could solve most tasks
involving time series, they still encounter the problem of
gradient vanishing or gradient exploding, which causes the
network unable to learn the dependency within long time steps.
Then LSTM(Long short-term memory) [30], [31] and GRU
[32] bring the gate mechanism allowing RNNs to learn the
context information from farther time steps. They are both
widely applied in the related tasks now.
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Fig. 3: LSTM structure.
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Taking LSTM as an example, its structure and the inner
cell is given in Fig. 3, along with the computation process
in formula (2). There are cell states c and gates participating
in the computation, where i, f, o, g stand for input gate, forget
gate, output gate, new input gate respectively, utilized to decide
the flow and weights of different parts of inputs.
III. RNN-TEST APPROACH
A. RNN-Test Overview
The overall workflow of RNN-Test is depicted in Fig. 4.
The workflow is not restricted to the classification context but
universally applicable for both the sequential and classification
contexts.
RNN-Test relies on three core modules to generate ad-
versarial inputs for recurrent neural networks, which are
RNN wrapper, adversary orientation maximizing and coverage
boosting. RNN wrapper extracts the hidden states and cell
states of each RNN cell in the given RNN, without affecting its
inherent process. The states obtained are crucial for adversarial
input generation and utilized in both the other two modules.
Additionally, our coverage metrics defined based on the states
are given in § III-B and § III-C.
In the module of adversary orientation maximizing, RNN-
Test integrates three orientation methods, including our pro-
posed state inconsistency orientation and two orientation meth-
ods adapted from other works [9], [27] performing well in
CNN testing, described in § III-E. These methods search the
adversarial inputs by maximizing the orientations designed to
lead the RNN to expose wrong behaviours. Meanwhile, the
module coverage boosting aims to generate adversarial inputs
by searching in the uncovered space of RNNs, referring to
§ III-F. The orientation methods and coverage guidances in the
two modules are free to be integrated together, thus allowing
RNN-Test to explore better means.
Finally, the integrated modules will produce a joint ob-
jective. Maximizing the objective by gradient ascent could
obtain the perturbation to modify the test input. Here we just
randomly modify one word or character out of the whole
sequential input, ensuring the modification is little enough
to maintain the original semantic meaning. As the words
and characters are in a discrete embedding space, the minute
perturbation applied to the test input probably will not lead to a
legal input. We adopt the nearest embedding as the adversarial
input after iteratively scaling the perturbation.
B. Key insights for coverage metrics.
Insights for state coverage. Based on the distinctive struc-
ture of RNN, the outputs of each RNN cell are hidden states,
denoted as h, which are vectors. For LSTM cell, the outputs
also incorporate cell states, denoted as c, also vectors always of
the same shape as h. The computation procedure is illustrated
in § II.
In the procedure, the hidden states play a key role for the
prediction, used to map to the prediction results. For one
input, if a specific hidden state has the maximum value of the
RNN cell outputs, the probabilities of its mapping part of the
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Fig. 4: Architecture of RNN-Test
prediction result tend to be higher as well. Thus, combinations
of hidden states lead to the varying prediction results. As
covering the permutations of each hidden state of the RNN
cell is extremely time-consuming, covering all the maximum
hidden states is a feasible solution. The definition for hidden
state coverage is given in formula (3).
In LSTM structure, cell states c are activated by tanh
function, and then to compute the hidden states h of the same
cell. As shown in Fig. 5a, the output value of tanh function
ranges from −1 to 1. According to our statistics, the activation
values of cell states mostly fall into the central range while
few be the boundary value. Hence we could measure the
coverage over the different ranges, but too many sections like
deepGauge [14] will be nonsense due to the narrow value
range. We split the sections each ranging from vi−1 to vi,
where vi are in the set [−1,−0.8,−0.2, 0.2, 0.8, 1] according
to tanh distribution. We suppose that covering more of each
section, especially the boundary sections, could exercise more
computation logics.
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Fig. 5: Graph of the activation functions, with end points of
sections as dots.
Insights for gate coverage. Multiple gates designed are
a prominent characteristic of GRU and LSTM model. In the
implementation, their gates are split from the concatenated
hidden states hl−1t and h
l
t−1, as in formula (2). Then they are
used for computing hlt and c
l
t after activation.
Similar to the statistics of activation values of cell states, the
activation values for each gate are also mainly in the central
range. We employs the same mechanism to compute the gate
coverage, by first splitting the value range to several sections
and then recording the coverage of each section. Moreover,
the sections for the gates activated by tanh are the same as
above, and the sections for other gates activated by sigmoid
are also separated based on its distribution, shown in Fig. 5b,
where vi from [0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9, 1]1.
C. Coverage definitions
Hidden state coverage. Assume all the hidden states of
an RNN model are represented by H . H is a matrix of
shape [S,L,B,E], where S,L,B are the number of the time
steps, layers and batch, respectively. E is the state size. The
shape of H varies among the RNN models, but S,L,B,E are
the necessary components. Note that modern DNNs always
process inputs in batch to accelerate the computation.
For a specific hidden state vector h = (s, l, b), where s ∈
{1, 2, ..., S}, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, b ∈ {1, 2, ..., B}, and E = |h|.
If a state e ∈ h and e = max(h), then the state e is covered.
Thus, the hidden state coverage HS C is computed as the
below formula (3).
HS C =
|{e ∈ h | e = max(h)}|
S × L×B × E (3)
Cell state coverage. All the cell states of an RNN model
are denoted as C, which is also a matrix of shape [S,L,B,E].
The value range of the activation function tanh is split to Sec
sections and each section is represented as seci = [vi−1, vi],
where −1 ≤ vi ≤ 1. For a specific cell state vector c =
(s, l, b), if a state e ∈ c and tanh(e) ∈ seci, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Sec},
then e is covered in seci. The cell state coverage in each
section is given in formula (4).
CS Cseci =
|{e ∈ c | tanh(e) ∈ seci}|
S × L×B × E (4)
Gate coverage. All the states that are utilized to compute
the gates of the RNN model are represented by G. The states
for each type of gate g are denoted as Gg , g ∈ {i, n, f, o}
for LSTM model as in § II-B. Gg is a matrix of shape
[S,L,B,Eg], Eg is the state size for gate g. If a state e ∈ g
and activation(e) ∈ seci, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., Sec} and activation
is the activation function for gate g, then e is covered in seci.
Thus, gate coverage Gg C is computed as formula (5) below.
Gg Cseci =
|{e ∈ g | activation(n) ∈ seci}|
S × L×B × Eg (5)
DX coverage. We also customize the neuron coverage in
DeepXplore owing to the great difference between traditional
DNN structure and RNN structure. For CNNs, DeepXplore
1The two sections are of these values in the boosting procedure but with
wider boundary sections when recording coverage, convenient for evaluations.
treats each feature map (outputs of the convolution layer, a
matrix of hundreds of values) as a neuron and takes the mean
value as the output. If the same as DeepXplore, hidden states h
of each cell will be treated as a neuron. Then, a common RNN
like the PTB model will only consist of fewer than 100 neurons
which one layer of CNN owns, and the coverage value will
be 100% just with several inputs. So we regard each hidden
state e as the neuron.
For all the hidden states H and a state e ∈ H , if its output
value after min-max normalization out(e) > t where t is the
user-defined threshold, then e is covered, as in formula (6).
DX C =
|{e | out(e) > t}|
S × L×B × E (6)
D. Adversary search
The core algorithm of RNN-Test is presented in Algorithm
1, in which the procedure COVERAGE BOOST is given in
Algorithm 2 and procedures retrieve states, get orient are
described in the following and § III-E, respectively.
Algorithm 1 RNN-Test algorithm
Input: inputs ← sequential inputs for testing
model ← RNN model under test
obj mode ← orientation, coverage, or joint objective
orient mode ← one of the three orientations
guided cov ← one of the four coverage metrics
embeddings ← embeddings of the vocabulary
MAX SCALE ← maximum degree of scaling the gradient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1: for x in inputs do
2: /*randomly select one time step(a word/character) to modify*/
3: t = random.sample(x)
4: H , C = retrieve states(model) //get hidden states and cell states
5: y = predict(x) //originally predict
6: obj orient = get orient(obj mode, orient mode, t, H , C)
7: obj cov = COVERAGE BOOST(obj mode, guided cov, H , C)
8: obj = obj orient + obj cov
9: grads = ∂obj/∂x
10: x′ = GEN ADV(x, t, grads, embeddings)
11: if x != x′ then
12: is generate = True //whether obtain the adversarial input
13: yˆ = predict(x′) //predict the adversarial input
14: update coverage(H , C, guided cov)
15: evaluate the model performance //record the metrics
16: /*generate the adversarial inputs*/
17: procedure GEN ADV(x, t, grads, embeddings)
18: x′ ← x
19: for scale in range(1, MAX SCALE) do
20: pert = grads[t] × scale //perturbation for the time step
21: x′′t = xt + pert //gradient ascent
22: for emb in embeddings do //distances of x′′t to embeddings
23: dist vector.append(norm(x′′t - emb))
24: min emb = min(dist vector) //the nearest embedding
25: if min emb != xt then
26: x′t = min emb
27: break
28: return x′
RNN wrapping. In the inherent implementation of a deep
RNN model taking a sequential input, it will output two data
elements before making predictions, which are all the hidden
states of the last layer, and all the hidden states and cell states
of the last time step. For the subsequent workflow, we need the
access to all the hidden states and cell states of each layer and
time step. We wrap the RNN cell implementation and keep
the hidden states and cell states of each cell, thus making all
the states available, corresponding to procedure retrieve states
in line 4.
Joint optimization objective. Opposed to the training
course minimizing the prediction error by tuning the param-
eters to achieve the desired performance, adversarial testing
tries [9], [11] to maximize their objectives by mutating the
test inputs to discover errors. Different optimization objectives
will make the RNN model target to different outputs when
mutating the input, with diverse capabilities of discovering
adversarial inputs. We explore multiple alternatives and com-
binations of objectives for adversarial testing for RNN models.
The optimization objective obj here includes two compo-
nents (Algorithm 1 line 8), adversary orientation maximizing
and coverage boosting, corresponding to obj orient in § III-E
and obj cov in § III-F. Note that the two components can be
utilized independently or combined together. Moreover, taking
the derivatives of obj with respect to the input x could obtain
the gradient direction along which obj increases or decreases
most (Algorithm 1 line 9). Afterwards RNN-Test mutates the
input by scaling the gradients (line 20) and then applying to
the input as the perturbations (line 21), thereby maximizing
the objective and obtaining the adversarial inputs.
Why use the nearest embedding. In the procedure
GEN ADV, we iteratively apply the perturbations and then
search the nearest word/character in the embedding space as
the adversarial inputs (line 22 to 27 in Algorithm 1). Due to
the discreteness of the embedding space of NLP tasks, this is
a straightforward way to obtain the adversarial inputs. Besides
that, the embedding representations of words or characters
in each NLP task are acquired after enough training, which
could unveil the semantic properties of the words or characters
and solve the task. Searching in the given embedding space
could get the adversarial inputs with the existing semantic
information.
Model performance metrics. In sequential tasks, there is
no obvious label of the predicted output to identify a generated
sequence as the adversarial input, unless introducing the
classification labels but violating the principle of generality.
Fortunately, the metrics measuring the model performance
are a good choice to exhibit the qualities of the adversarial
inputs (Algorithm 1 line 15), which are supposed to be
accessible in all the tasks.
E. Adversary orientation maximizing
In RNN-Test, we explore three adversary orientations in
adversarial testing for RNNs, including our proposed state
inconsistency orientation, adapted cost orientation in FGSM
[9] and decision boundary orientation in DLFuzz [27].
State inconsistency orientation. The state inconsistency
orientation is designed based upon the inner logic of RNN cell.
As shown in formula (1) and (2), the states hlt increase linearly
with the states of hlt−1 and c
l
t, if c implemented. Therefore,
the state inconsistency orientation tries to increase hlt−1 and c
l
t
while decrease hlt simultaneously, leading the RNN to unusual
behaviours, which is formulated in formula (7).
obj orient = hlt−1 + c
l
t − hlt (7)
Cost orientation. FGSM and many other works [9], [33]
generate the adversarial inputs by maximizing the loss of the
predicted output label and original output label. For sequential
tasks in RNN, the loss Lseq is mostly the weighted cross-
entropy loss for a sequence of logits [34], briefly listed in
formula (8), which is encapsulated in the implementation of
the model and is accessible via APIs.
obj orient = Lseq(y, yˆ) (8)
Decision boundary orientation. Decision boundary orien-
tation is designed to decrease the probability of the original
predicted label and increase the probabilities of other top k
labels in prediction. For RNN testing, we adapted this idea
with respect to the specific time step t to mutate in the input,
as its outputs yˆt are also a vector with softmax probabilities,
formulated in (9).
obj orient =
k∑
i=0
yˆti − yˆt (9)
F. Coverage boosting
The coverage boosting module targets to cover the uncov-
ered states and sections, in this way to search for adversarial
inputs. As in formula (10), RNN-Test selects n hidden states
or cell states to boost their values. Besides the strategy of
randomly selecting the states uncovered or with uncovered
boundary sections, RNN-Test also adopts boosting procedure
to select the states with values near the boundary section
endpoints and guides their values to reach the boundaries, as in
Algorithm 2. This given procedure is for the coverage metrics
defined on a series of sections. For HS C and DX coverage,
the procedure selects states with values close to be covered.
obj cov =
n∑
i=0
e, e ∈ {h, c} (10)
Algorithm 2 Coverage boosting procedure
1: procedure COVERAGE BOOST(obj mode, guided cov,H,C)
2: /*Describe the procedure for CS C boosting as an example*/
3: C sorted = sort(C)
4: C sorted r = sort(C)[::-1] //sort the states reversely
5: low id ← the first c in C sorted with value > v0
6: high id ← the first c in C sorted r with value < vSec
7: lower states = C sorted[low id: low id + n/2]
8: higher states = C sorted r[high id: high id + n/2]
9: obj cov = higher states - lower states
10: return obj cov
IV. EXPERIMENT
A. Experiment Setup
Implementation. We developed the framework RNN-Test
on the widely deployed framework tensorflow 1.3.0, and
evaluated RNN-Test on a computer having Ubuntu 16.04 as
the host OS, with an Intel i7-7700HQ@3.6GHz processor of
8 cores, 16GB of memory and an NVIDIA GTX 1070 GPU.
We evaluate RNN-Test on two RNN models processing se-
quential tasks, including PTB language model of basic LSTM
structure as in Fig. 3a, and a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq)
spell checker model with a bi-direction LSTM in the encoding
layer and Bahdanau Attention [35] in the decoding layer.
These two models are selected due to their general structures
and application contexts.
PTB language model [28] is a popular RNN model on
Penn Tree Bank dataset, which is the implementation of [31].
It takes a part of texts as input and predict the subsequent
texts, that is, the word after each input word. We trained the
word-based PTB model with test perplexity of 117.54 on its
‘small’ config, consistent with the result reported in [31]. This
model could be used for text generation, which is to generate
new texts similar to the style of the trained text data.
Seq2seq spell checker model [29] receives a sentence with
spelling mistakes as input, and outputs the sentence with the
mistakes corrected. We trained the character-based model with
the sequence loss of 10.1%, similar to 15% they reported.
The training data used are twenty popular books from project
Gutenberg [36]. We construct 160 test sentences with spelling
mistakes like the example sentences they give, thanks to rich
sources from Tatoeba [37].
Research Questions (RQs): We constructed the experi-
ments to answer the following research questions.
• RQ1. Are the adversary orientation maximizing methods
effective for adversarial input generation? (§ IV-B)
• RQ2. Are the proposed coverage metrics helpful for
adversarial input generation? (§ IV-C)
• RQ3. Could retraining with the adversarial inputs im-
prove the RNN models? (§ IV-D)
Evaluations metrics. To answer RQ1 and RQ2, we also
present the the performance of the tested models on the
original test set, as well as the set of adversarial inputs
obtained by randomly replacing a word/character of each input
as the baseline setting. Here we list the performance metrics
of the tested models plus with other necessary metrics.
• pp. Test perplexity, the inverse probability of the test
set as universe metric for language models, where lower
perplexity corresponds to better model.
• ppi. Test perplexity of each input on average.
• WER. Word error rate, the correlation of predicted out-
puts with the ground truth as generic metric for seq2seq
models, where higher WER means worse predictions.
• BLEU. Bilingual evaluation understudy, similar to WER
but higher BLEU means better predictions.
• gen rate. Ratio of the test set the method has successfully
produced the adversarial input.
• orient rate. Ratio of the generated set obtained by our
method, not at random.
• suc rate. Ratio of the generated set the corrected mistakes
in the original input appearing in the prediction result of
the adversarial input.
• l2 norm. Distortion of the perturbation.
B. Effectiveness of the adversary orientation methods (RQ1)
We run each orientation method recording each coverage
metric on the tested models for 3 times, the same in the
baseline setting, so as to alleviate the uncertainty running each
time. Each coverage guidance and each combination of joint
objectives are also run 3 times in following assessments. In
below presented results, we denote the orientation method by
their first word, the coverage guidance by the notation of the
definitions in § III-C and their combination as the respective
joint objective.
The average results of orientation methods are summarized
in Table I and Table II, leaving the achieved coverage and
samples of adversarial inputs given in RQ2, convenient for
the comparison. In Table I, the set of adversarial inputs always
reach higher perplexity than the original test set, inferring that
the adversarial inputs could lead the model to expose worse
behaviours. Overall, the orientation methods could obtain
1.7% higher perplexity than the baseline setting, but the cost
and decision boundary orientations obtain lower perplexity on
the whole test set than the baseline, maybe due to the smaller
distortion and gen rate.
TABLE I: Effectiveness of the adversary orientation methods
on PTB model. The best result across the column is denoted
in bold and the last row for average results of our methods,
the same in following tables.
Orientation ppi pp gen rate l2 norm.
original 355.11 157.76 – –
baseline 554.04 253.20 100% –
cost 603.78 245.05 95.94% 28.43
decision 584.86 252.39 94.30% 30.96
state 618.19 275.08 100% 82.14
avg. orientation 602.28 257.51 96.75% 47.18
TABLE II: Effectiveness of the adversary orientation methods
on spell checker model, each with gen rate as 100%.
Orientation WER BLEU orient rate l2 norm. suc rate
original 3.71 0.915 – – –
baseline 5.04 0.876 – – 65.48%
cost 5.10 0.877 97.38% 0.002 70.24%
decision 5.33 0.871 100% 2.32 74.29%
state 5.26 0.871 100% 10.39 73.33%
avg. orientation 5.23 0.873 99.13% 4.24 72.62%
For spell checker model, the adversarial inputs obtained
by the orientation methods could also reduce the model
performance, with higher WER and lower BLEU score. But
except the state inconsistency orientation with 100% gen rate,
the cost orientation and decision boundary orientation achieve
relatively low gen rate, with the former 74.29% and the latter
85.71%. Considering the fairness, we boost the gen rate of
each method to be 100% by attempting to modify each char-
acter of the targeted input until the adversarial inputs obtained
otherwise randomly replaced. The results are summarized in
Table II, showing that the orientations could achieve 40.97%
and 3.77% higher WER, 4.59% and 0.34% lower BLEU score
than the original and baseline setting respectively, and also
7.14% higher suc rate than the baseline.
The answer to RQ1: The state inconsistency orientation
could increase 1.7% more perplexity of the PTB model than
baseline. All the orientation methods can achieve higher
suc rate on the spell checker model than baseline, with the
state inconsistency orientation always of 100% gen rate.
C. Effectiveness of the coverage metrics (RQ2)
Effectiveness of coverage guidance for adversarial input
generation. Table III provides the results of multiple coverage
metrics as guidance for the adversarial input generation on the
spell checker model. On the PTB model, only CS C guidance
achieves 1.7% higher perplexity than the baseline, whereas
others lower than the baseline, not listed here.
In Table III, all the coverage guidances are effective in
adversarial input generation and better than the baseline, where
Gi C and Gn C are not implemented due to the model struc-
ture. The gate coverage metrics Gf C and Go C achieved
highest suc rate with smallest perturbations. Moreover, CS C
reached best WER and BELU score with 100% orient rate
while the adapted DX also gained good results.
TABLE III: Effectiveness of the coverage metrics on spell
checker model, each with gen rate as 100%.
Coverage WER BLEU orient rate l2 norm. suc rate
original 3.71 0.915 – – –
baseline 5.04 0.876 – – 65.48%
HS C 4.87 0.878 100% 0.02 71.43%
CS C 5.68 0.871 100% 2.41 72.62%
Gf C 5.10 0.874 97.62% 0.01 77.38%
Go C 5.24 0.874 98.81% 0.01 76.19%
DX 5.42 0.872 97.22% 0.48 73.81%
avg. coverage 5.26 0.874 98.73% 0.59 74.29%
The enhancement of coverage guidance to adversarial
input generation. RNN-Test supports the various joint objec-
tives of the orientations and coverage guidances to search for
the better means for adversarial testing. Table IV and Table
V present each orientation with two coverage guidances with
the highest pp and suc rate among all the combinations for
the two models respectively.
On both models, the state inconsistency orientation together
with CS C guidance achieved better results than other objec-
tives, except the enormous perturbations. As Table I and Table
III, they each produced much larger perturbations and become
even unusual when combined here. Upon this issue, we have
attempted to restrict the perturbations of all the methods by
dividing with their respective l2 norm, which make their l2
norm all less than 21. Nevertheless, after restriction, only the
state inconsistency orientation combined with CS C guidance
still get 1.7% higher perplexity than the baseline but all the
others not. This implies that restriction could not be a good
choice for other methods on the PTB model. In contrast, the
results for the spell checker model vary little after restriction.
Next, on average, the joint objectives could acquire better
results than the orientations and the coverage guidances on
the PTB model, indicating that the coverage guidances could
enhance the performance of the adversarial input generation.
Simultaneously, the coverage guidances obtained the highest
suc rate and WER on the spell checker model. Note that,
the coverage guidance methods always have the smallest
perturbations. Overall, RNN-Test increases the test perplexity
by 58.11% than the original setting for PTB model, and
acquire adversarial inputs with the success rate of 73.44%,
both averaged over the results of all our methods.
Finally, the samples of adversarial inputs on the tested
models are listed in Table VI, with each method to modify the
same word/character. For the PTB model, different methods
tend to generate different words. But for the spell checker
model, most of the methods incline to generate the same
character, except the method state+CS C, maybe because of
the sparse embedding space.
TABLE IV: Effectiveness of the diverse objectives on ptb
model, where avg. joint are the results for all combinations
of objectives. The best result across the column among the
three methods is in bold red and the same in below table.
Joint objective ppi pp gen rate l2 norm.
cost+Go C 595.91 255.73 96.17% 30.30
cost+CS C 575.23 254.78 98.36% 34.34
decision+CS C 572.99 260.11 98.36% 36.04
decision+Gi C 602.23 267.06 95.08% 32.26
state+CS C 684.61 299.60 100% 6210.00
state+Go C 671.20 286.39 99.45% 1940.97
baseline 554.04 253.20 100% –
avg. joint 605.79 258.56 97.77% 1093.29
avg. orientation 602.28 257.51 96.75% 47.18
avg. coverage 576.69 232.22 89.50% 19.47
TABLE V: Effectiveness of the diverse objectives on spell
checker model, each with gen rate as 100%.
Joint objective WER BLEU orient rate l2 norm. suc rate
cost+HS C 4.95 0.875 97.62% 0.03 73.81%
cost+Gf C 5.19 0.873 97.62% 0.01 71.43%
decision+CS C 5.24 0.872 100% 2.39 77.38%
decision+Gf C 5.11 0.871 100% 2.07 76.19%
state+CS C 5.48 0.870 100% 467.93 77.38%
state+HS C 5.08 0.871 97.62% 97.98 76.19%
baseline 5.04 0.876 – – 65.48%
avg. joint 5.19 0.873 98.65% 59.38 73.41%
avg. orientation 5.23 0.873 99.13% 4.24 72.62%
avg. coverage 5.26 0.874 98.73% 0.59 74.29%
Our customized metrics compared with the adapted DX
coverage. In the evaluations, the boosting procedure is adopted
for redefined DX coverage, not using that (randomly select
one uncovered state) of DeepXplore. On the PTB model using
DX as guidance, our boosting strategy achieves 35.71% higher
perplexity than the random strategy of DeepXplore, even with
more states selected. Meanwhile, the adapted DX coverage as
guidance performs well for spell checker model and so for
both models when combined with the orientations. Finally,
the weakness of DX coverage is still evident that the coverage
reaches 90% with at most four inputs on the PTB model when
taking a higher threshold 0.5 in DeepXplore, thus having bad
discrimination over enough inputs.
Correlation of the coverage with adversarial inputs. In
previous works, researchers believe that exercising more logics
of DNNs could trigger more wrong behaviours. We analysed
the correlations of the evaluations metrics and the value of
coverage metrics. Based on the acquired data, we could not
draw the conclusion that obtaining higher coverage definitely
results in more incorrect outputs. Fig. 6 presents the results
with the most evident correlations, and most other results are
messed up in such figures.
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Fig. 6: The evaluations metrics of adversarial inputs with the
value of CS C0, the left for all the methods in different runs
and the right for the coverage guidance in different runs.
Boosting the coverage. In the coverage boosting module,
RNN-Test tries both the boosting procedure and random
strategy to select states to cover. In our evaluations, we found
that there is no gold rule to increase all the coverage metrics.
They each has the advantages over the other for different tested
models and coverage metrics, shown in Fig. 7. Nevertheless,
in most cases, utilizing the boosting procedure brings about
the better testing effectiveness, leading the model to perform
worse. It must be claimed that the coverage values strongly
depend on the number of test inputs, the same amount of inputs
are supposed to be with similar coverage.
Perturbation similarity between orientation maximizing
and coverage boosting. Based on the statement that the
perturbations generated by the coverage guidance are similar
to the orientation search and so not add much [38], we
record perturbation vectors obtained over several same inputs
in the experiments. To visualize, we leverage the state-of-
the-art high-dimensional reduction technique TSNE [39] to
transform the multi-dimensional perturbation vectors to the
two-dimensional space, where orientation methods with more
data. As Fig. 8 shows, there is no evident similarity of per-
turbation vectors of the orientations, coverage guidances and
joint objectives. Together with observations of the correlation
above, we guess the coverage guidance should be used as the
unique way for adversarial input generation, not only the goal
to improve.
TABLE VI: Samples of adversarial inputs on the tested models, the targeted words to modify are in red and underlined.
Objective PTB model spell checker model
original Input: no it was n’t black monday, but while the
ppi: 259.67
Input: I would swim through theoocean just to see your smile again.
Predict:I would swim through the ocean just to see your smile again.
Input: Tom called me a partypooper because I lef tthe party just afpter midnight.
Predict: Tom called me a partypooper because I left the party just after midnight.
orientation
Input: no it told n’t black monday, but while the
orientation: cost, ppi:320.34
Input: no it the n’t black monday, but while the
orientation: decision, ppi:506.38
Input: I would swim through thooocean just to see your smile again.
Predict: I would swim through thoocean just to see your smile again.
Input: Tom called me a partypooper because I Ief tthe party just afpter midnight.
Predict: Tom called me a partypooper because I I the party just after midnight.coverage Input: no it east n’t black monday, but while thecoverage: Gi C, ppi: 1322.99
state+CS C Input: no it N n’t black monday, but while the
ppi: 446.325
Input: I would swim through thhoocean just to see your smile again.
Predict: I would swim through thooce an just to see your smile again.
Input: Tom called me a partypooper because I eef tthe party just afpter midnight.
Predict: Tom called me a partypooper because I eef the party just after midnight.
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Fig. 7: The distribution of coverage metrics. The labels of x
axis are in short, those start with ‘0’ for orientations denoted
by first several characters, ‘1’ for coverage guidance, ‘2’ for
joint objectives, and those end with ‘r’ use the random strategy.
The answer to RQ2: The coverage metrics as guidance
are also effective in adversarial input generation, with en-
hancement to the orientations on the PTB model and best
performance on the spell checker model.
D. Improving the RNN models with retraining (RQ3)
For CNN testing, retraining the tested models by augment-
ing the training set with adversarial inputs could improve
the accuracy of the tested models [12], [27]. Inspired by
the impressive effects, we tried on the PTB model and in-
corporated adversarial inputs (82.5 KB) to the open-source
training set (5.1 MB), where the adversarial inputs are obtained
in the setting of decision boundary orientation. Additionally,
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Fig. 8: The TSNE transformation of perturbations generated
by different objectives for one same test input.
the adversarial inputs obtained by the state inconsistency
orientation achieved similar results, not listed here.
Table VII presents the perplexity of the PTB model before
and after retraining, where the train perplexity indicates the
performance on the training set while the valid perplexity
for the valid set. Here the data are averaged over 5 times
of running the same retraining process with 12 epochs, to
mitigate the affects due to the intrinsic indeterminism of neural
networks. From column 4 and 7, the results show that the train
perplexity of the model after retraining increases by 1.082%
whereas the valid perplexity decreases by 1.159% in the end.
Moreover, the original test perplexity is 117.53 and that after
retraining is 102.75, thus also declined by 12.582%. Notice
that even by incorporating fewer adversarial inputs (1.6KB),
the valid perplexity still declines by 0.058%.
Therefore, the adversarial inputs generated for RNN models
are proved to have practical use for improving the models.
They could alleviate the over-fitting issue of the training
process by reducing little train performance, but improving
the valid and test performance and thus the robustness of the
RNN model.
The answer to RQ3: The adversarial inputs could also be
used to improve the performance of RNN models. By aug-
menting the adversarial inputs of 82.5 KB to the training set
of 5.1 MB, the valid and test perplexity of the PTB language
model declines by 1.159% and 12.582% respectively.
TABLE VII: The perplexity before and after retraining on the
PTB model. Column 3 and 5 for the augmented training set
and column 4 and 7 for the improvement of retraining results
w.r.t the original results.
epoch train pp valid pporiginal w. adv. increment original w. adv. decrement
0 290.584 288.579 -0.690% 190.004 192.096 -1.101%
2 113.216 113.712 0.439% 140.328 140.339 -0.008%
4 86.290 87.195 1.049% 132.589 132.969 -0.287%
6 56.282 56.961 1.207% 121.410 120.566 0.695%
8 46.549 47.082 1.146% 122.981 121.611 1.114%
10 43.991 44.474 1.096% 123.065 121.385 1.365%
12 43.227 43.695 1.082% 122.440 121.020 1.159%
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY.
Though RNN-Test exhibits appreciable effectiveness with
the default setting in the evaluations, its performance is
inevitably influenced by the parameters, including the scaling
degree of the perturbations, the number of states selected to
boost and the weights applied to the joint objectives, especially
the ways of sections splitting of CS C and Gg C. They are
worthy to be well explored in the future work, on account
of the important roles. Furthermore, the uncertainty running
each time still exists in the presented results, owing to differ-
ent search directions over stochastic targeted word/character,
which could be diminished by fixing the target.
In addition, RNN-Test is devoted to be general and scalable
for the variants of RNNs, but we could not exhaustively
apply the framework to all the variants and their targeted
applications. In this paper, the structures of the tested models
are general to some extent, but training the spell checker model
still costs hard work, due to its bad reproducibility of the
training results given. Moreover, the RNN wrapper is designed
to avoid interfering with the computation logics of the model,
but the adapting efforts may be necessary for some variants
with complex structures.
VI. RELATED WORK
Adversarial deep learning. The concept of adversarial
attacks was first introduced in [8]. It discovered that DNNs
would misclassify the input images by applying impercep-
tible perturbations, where these mutated inputs are called
adversarial examples/inputs. Their work FGSM [9] and the
following works [11], [33], [40], [41] generate the adversarial
examples by maximizing the prediction error in the gradient-
based manner. Multiple trends are then developed, including
targeted attacks [10], [33] and non-targeted attacks [11], [42],
whitebox attacks [9], [33] and blackbox attacks [42], defense
techniques [43]–[47] and methodologies like C&W attacks
[33] to construct adversarial attacks particularly against the
defense methods, etc.
As metioned before, they are mostly limited to the image
classification tasks. Besides, without concerns of covering the
computation logics of the models, they are shown to reach low
test coverage [12].
Coverage guided testing of DNN systems. DeepXplore
[12] first introduces neuron coverage into deep learning test-
ing, defined over neurons of DNNs with the pre-defined thresh-
old, requiring redefinition for RNNs as discussed earlier. Due
to the coarse granularity of neuron coverage, DeepGauge [14]
defines more coverage metrics with finer-grained granularity.
The key idea is to record the value range of outputs of training
data as the major function region and split the region to k,
e.g., 1000, sections, also not suitable for narrow value range
of RNN states. DeepCT [48] is even fine-grained to measure
over combinations of neuron outputs. It is noteworthy that
[38] argues that these works [12], [13], [48] fail to find more
adversarial inputs than the adversary-oriented search and not
efficiently measure the robustness of models as they reported.
The main difference between these works and ours lies
in that, we primarily use the coverage as guidance directly to
obtain the adversarial inputs, where the coverage metrics in
other works are always the indicator of the effectiveness of
their approaches.
Adversarial attacks for recurrent neural networks. Due
to the effectiveness of RNNs [49] on the tasks like speech
recognition and natural language processing, adversarial at-
tacks are also applied to RNNs to evaluate their robustness.
Besides the works [22], [23], [25], [50] adopting the strategies
to add, delete or substitute a word/character to construct the
adversarial inputs, some methods [22] replace the targeted
word with its synonym. Other approaches [21] restrict the
directions of perturbations toward the existing words in the
input embedding space. In summary, these works are effective
but limited to the classification scenarios.
There are few works evaluating the tasks processing sequen-
tial outputs. The work [24] first explains the definition of ad-
versarial inputs for RNNs with categorical outputs and sequen-
tial outputs, but just presents rough qualitative descriptions that
adversarial inputs could result in the change of outputs for
evaluations on sequential outputs. Another work TensorFuzz
[25] produced adversarial inputs to lead the language model to
sample words from blacklist, which is not even specified in the
paper. For state-of-the-art adversarial attacks [51] for speech
recognition, the perturbations obtained could be applied to the
audio waves in a similar way to the images, but still face
several unsettled issues [51]. The testing works for sequential
outputs, especially texts, are inadequate and leave threats for
majority application scenarios with sequential outputs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We design and implement a generic adversarial testing
framework RNN-Test for recurrent neural networks, inte-
grating diverse adversary orientations and coverage metrics
customized for RNNs with the support of free combinations.
RNN-Test focuses on the main sequential contexts without
limit to the classification tasks and first leverages coverage
guidance to directly obtain adversarial inputs. For evaluation,
RNN-Test effectively generated adversarial inputs to increase
the test perplexity of the PTB language model by 58.11% on
average, and caused the spell checker model not correcting the
mistakes with the success rate of 73.44% averagely. Finally,
the adversarial inputs can be employed to retrain the PTB
model and decrease its valid perplexity and test perplexity by
1.159% and 12.582% respectively.
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